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This paper analyzes political pressure on the National Bank of Slovakia, using  the 
Havrilesky (1993) methodology based on media signalling. This methodology 
allows the pressure on the Central Bank of Slovakia to be compared with the 
pressure on the central banks to which the methodology was already applied, 
namely – the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Czech 
National Bank. The analysis and the comparison reveals a relatively weak signalling 
of pressure in media in Slovakia and prevailance of financial sector representatives 
as the main commentaries on monetary policy of the National Bank of Slovakia in 
the period before euro adoption. 
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Independent central banks are one of the most interesting institutional features in the overal 
framework of economic policy that is generally performed by government. However, as 
anecdotical evidence shows, independent central banks are often challenged by various 
political groups. Central banks` long-term interests of economic stability might be in conflict 
with short-term interests of diverse pressure groups including elected politicians. Since the 
monetary policy is a powerful tool to influence macroeconomic variables like GDP growh, 
inflation or wage growth, etc., the pressure groups attempt to find channels to influence 
current monetary policy in line with their interests.  
Furthermore, it is technically impossible for a central bank (CB) to be perfectly detached from 
the political system. The members of central bank`s board are usually selected by political 
meachanisms and appointed by parliament, government or the president. The central banks 
legislation which defines the legal environment for the central bank is formed by legislative 
bodies.  
This paper focus on the political pressure that has been executed on the National Bank of 
Slovakia (NBS). We use the methodology firstly presented by Havrilesky (1993) and further 
extended by Maier (2002) and Geršl (2006). Our primary objective is to find out whether 
there have been any political pressure exercised on the National Bank of Slovakia in the 
period before Slovakia adopted the euro in 2009 and what was the pattern of the pressure. 
This methodology also allows for comparisons of those central banks for which studies of 
political pressure exist. 
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the topic of this paper, Chapter 2 
surveys the existing literature on the political business cycles. In Chapter 3 we describe the 
methodology used, Chapter 4 discusses the findings as to the pressure on government while 
Chapter 5 also looks at other pressure groups and compares the results with Germany and the 
Czech Republic. Chapter 6 shows the support for the Slova central bank as indicated by media 
signalling. Chapter 7 concludes. 
2. Survey of the literature 
The relationships between the politics and macroeconomic policy have fascinated economists 
long time ago. The central concept of this area of research constitutes the Political Business   2
Cycle (PBC). The original notion of PBC is attributed to German economist Karl Marx
1. The 
PBC approach has two important features: voters, who are assumed to maximise their 
individual utilities; the incumbent politicians, who are assumed to implement those policies 
that allow them to retain power. The incumbent politicians stimulate the economy to acquire 
the maximum number of votes so as to get re-elected, and this stimulus in turn causes the 
economy to fluctuate around its long-run path. It is widely known expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policy have popular effects in the short run (tax cuts, falling unemployment and interest 
rates, government spending, etc.).  However, in the long run these very policies tend to have 
directly opposite impacts (rising inflation, distorted trade balance, high government share on 
GDP, etc.). So after the elections the incumbent politicians restrict the monetary and fiscal 
policy to stabilize the economy. And this results in the artificially engineered boom and bust 
sequences labelled as the political business cycles. A political business cycle is therefore the 
economy’s fluctuation around its long-run behaviour generated by the political system, as 
pointed out by Gautier (2003).  
The study of the Political Business Cycles can be divided into two main waves: 
Opportunistic/Electoral Models and Partisan Models, each having either Adaptive or Rational 
Voters. The first serious theoretical concept in the study of the PBCs was originally 
formalized by Nordhaus (1975). According to Nordhaus the opportunistic incumbent 
politicians are only interested in being re-elected. In order to do this they would exploit the 
well-known inverse relationship between unemployment and inflation (the Phillips curve) in 
the short run. His model is defined as opportunistic with adaptive voters. Thus the expected 
inflation is based only on past inflation. The empirical works have been always mixed in this 
area of research. One of the first empirical works was done by Edward R. Tufte (1978)
2; in his 
seminal work he analyses the PBCs in the United Stated of America. This study together with 
Kramer (1971), Fair (1978), Hibbs (1987) show the validity of this notion for presidential 
elections; then again Tufte (1975, 1978) for congressional elections and finally Madsen 
(1980), Lewis-Beck (1988) for European democracies.  
The rational opportunistic model deviates from the traditional opportunistic model with 
adaptive voters. This model was originally proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1990). 
According to Gautier (2003) the model can be described as follows. Voting is not 
retrospective but forward-looking, inflation expectations are rational, they do not depend only 
on past information of inflation but on the information available at the time of the election.  
Thus, under rational expectations, voters and other economic actors can foresee elections and 
the incentives of incumbent policy-makers, so political business cycles should not exist or 
should not have any real effects. This would be true if the incumbent policy-makers did not 
posses any informational advantage over voters, so Persson and Tabellini (1990) introduced 
a competence factor in their model. The competence factor together with the information 
assymetries differentiates governments` ability to handle the economy. Franseze and Jusko 
(2005)
3 note that empirical research does not contradict rational expectations PBCs with 
competence factor.  
The first notion of partisanship in PBC was presented in Hotelling-Downs-Black (1929, 1957, 
1958) model. They considered two parties which build their reputations on distinct political 
preferences. They speculated how different political preferences would interact with the 
median voter. The first thorough analysis was presented by political economist Douglas Hibbs 
                                                 
1 Connected to the name Karl Marx is a branch of political economy also concerned with economic policy. It is called Neo-
Marxist approach which treats electoral politics as relatively insignificant and it has received very limited attention.  
2 See Tufte E. R.: Political Control of the Economy, Princeton, 1978. 
3 Franzese & Jusko (2005), p. 9.   3
(1977). Following Gautier`s (2003) description, Hibb`s partisan models assume a two-party 
political system where each party has different preferences about economic policy: the right-
wing party is concerned more about the inflation, while the left-wing party cares more about 
the unemployment and growth. Therefore, the macroeconomic fluctuations are caused by 
different party preferences (considering the movements along the Phillips curve). Another 
difference from the opportunistic model is that the key actors of the model are no longer 
political candidates but the voters. Each voter is to choose an appropriate candidate who better 
suits him according to the party`s preferences about economic policy. Franzese & Jusko 
(2005)
4 conclude there is an extensive evidence for partisan cycles relative to the electoral 
cycles discussed previously. Hibbs (1987b), Paldman (1989), and others find supporting 
evidence for broader OECD samples. Alesina and his various colleagues also confirms 
existence of partisan-cycles in the US and the OECD countries.  
The empirical support for the adaptive partisan PBC seems fairly consistent so it would be 
natural to think there is no need for partisan model with rational expectations (RE). However, 
to fill the gap in the theoretical needs of RE economics Alesina (1987, 1988) introduced 
Rational Partisan Theory (RPT)
5. It was motivated by the notion that fully anticipated 
macroeconomic policies under rational expectations are ineffective.  
The models just discussed are not appropriate for our study, therefore some modifications 
must be made, some new approaches must be explored. Schultz (1995) states that pre-election 
manipulations of economic policy will vary inversely with the government's security going 
into the election, as measured by popular opinion polls. It implies that the political economic 
cycles should occur only then and to the degree that they are needed. He supports his 
hypothesis with empirical study of the UK government transfer payments from 1961 to 1992. 
He concludes that government`s economic manipulations vary from election to election 
because government`s incentives vary, too. Sieg (2006) introduces a compelling modification 
to the rigid differentiation between partisan and opportunistic approach. If the government is 
indecisive on when to undertake what kind of policy to maximise its utility, it either 
implements its ideological policy if popularity is high, or secures its re-election by 
implementing opportunistic policy, if popularity is low.  
Maier (2002)
6 describes models which are not specifically linked to election dates, rather they 
analyze the tensions between the central bank and government at any time. He calls them the 
conflict models. Vaubel (1997) looks at the political preferences of the central bankers by 
considering their party affiliation. Hence, a following situation might arise that a left-wing 
government has to cope with a „rightist“ central bank council and vice versa. He named this 
approach „Party Preference Theory“ (PPT). Frey and Schneider (1981) focus on conflicts 
between the government and the central bank at any time. They state the central bank is 
generally independent following goal of low inflation which reflects the desires of the 
financial community. Though, in the times of conflict with the government, the central bank 
has to submit to the wishes of the government. Otherwise, it could be easily overruled by the 
government by changing the central bank law.  
                                                 
4 Franzese & Jusko (2005), p. 13-14. 
5 There are merely suble differences between RE and non-RE theories of macroeconomic outcomes. In non-RE theories the 
incumbent politicians manipulate stable Phillips curve to shift macroeconomic outcomes permanently. In RE theories - (RPT) 
- only unancipated policiy creates real effects. So for example when the left-wing party wins, inflation rises but real outcomes 
rise as far as the winner party so the shift in the economic policy was unforseen. 
6 Maier (2002), p. 11-12   4
Cukierman (1998)
7 drives attention to a different class of models. This root of research is 
revolving around Political Monetary Cycle (PMC)
8, which is part of a  wider segment of 
literature (PBC) studied above. The importance of monetary policy here has its justification as 
proposed by Havrilesky`s hypothesis that monetary policy is often used to offset the incentive 
and other politically adverse effects of non-monetary, distributionally motivated policies. In 
comparison to the early partisan theory of PBC, these models do not a have a permanently 
exploitable trade-off between political activity and inflation, and policy objectives may 
change even during the term of office of the same party. Other authors try incorporating the 
central bank into the equation as the monetary policy is not exclusively in the hands of 
incumbent politicians. Nathaniel Beck
9 incorporates the Fed into the model. He adds the Fed 
operates in a world of great uncertainty. Sometimes the uncertainty is so great that the Fed 
comes close to tossing a coin on some economic decision. In this extreme situation if one 
outcome will help an incumbent government and other will hurt it, it does seem reasonable for 
the Fed to choose the former option.  
Brender & Drazen (2005) are attentive to the political-economic processes in Slovakia among 
others. They test a model in a large sample of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003 (1994-
2003 for the Slovak Republic). Higher growth rate of real GDP per capita increases the 
probability of getting re-elected in less developed countries and new democracies (which 
includes the Slovak Republic) but voters are affected by GDP growth over the incumbent`s 
term in the office rather than in the election year. This research suggests the presence of a 
political business cycle in the Slovak Republic. Considering the influence of GDP through the 
whole term suggests the voters are adaptive while the model itself belongs to the conflict 
models. Alpanda & Honig (2007) studied large sample of countries including the Slovak 
Republic. They tested political monetary cycles between 1972 and 2001, more specifically 
how does the rise in M1 correlate with election cycles
10. The results say de facto CBI 
independece is very high in the Slovak Republic
11. 
 
3. Havrilesky methodology with Maier`s extension applied on NBS 
Not many PBC researchers included a central bank in its framework. They rather assumed 
direct control of policy instruments by an incumbent government. However, the central bank 
is de jure independent. So the government may only try to influence the central bank to accept 
its preferred policy in the case they have conflicting interests. In order to measure the pressure 
from the government on the central bank and whether the central bank has succumbed to it we 
need a „conflict indicator“.  
Such an indicator was proposed by Havrilesky (1993) in his respectable study on pressure on 
the Federal Reserve. The indicator is based on the number of newspaper articles in which 
politicians argue in the favour of more or less expansionary monetary policy. He counted the 
articles in the Wall Street Journal where incumbent politicians demanded a  change in 
monetary policy. An article demanding monetary ease was assigned value of +1, while article 
demaning monetary restriction was assigned value of -1. The sum of all pluses and minuses 
                                                 
7 Cukierman (1998), p. 333-336.  
8 These models are more closely linked to the Havrilesky (1993) methodology utilised in this paper comparing to the models 
described above. 
9 Mayer (1990), p. 115-130.  
10 They estimate panel regressions of a monetary policy indicator on an election dummy and control variables. 
11 That is also true for Germany, the Czech Republic and the U.S.- countries for which the Pressure Indicator was constructed 
so far.   5
constitutes the SAFER
12 index so that the positive value would indicate „net“ pressure for 
monetary ease. 
This approach was then applied on the Deutsche Bundesbank by Philipp Maier (2002). Maier 
extended this approach in two ways.  
First, he included in his research also pressure signals from other interest groups besides the 
government. This groups include: financial sector, employers, trade unions and others 
including academics, international institutions and other unspecified groups demanding 
monetary change. The explanation here is that not only government but also other interest 
groups might have substantial motivation to influence the policy of the central bank. For 
example, banking sector has many motives to do so. According to Wooley (1984)
13 banks can 
profit from tight monetary policy when the economy is entering recession and they can profit 
from monetary expansion, too (the good business is good for banks, too). As net creditors, 
banks fear the unexpected inflation the most. So bankers desire stability and predictability in 
the financial development. Furthermore, bankers have many political resources, some arising 
from organizational and financial sources and others from the fact that the central bank needs 
support of bankers. There are also institutions which have respectable influence on the 
financial developments – ABA (American Bankers Association), SBA (Slovenská Banková 
Asociácia), CBA (Česká Bankovní Asociace). 
Employers have also lots of interests when it comes to monetary policy. Low interest rate 
surely enables new investments and expands businesses. However, as we will soon observe, 
in a small open economy they might be also concerned about exchange rate interventions 
(which might be consistent with interest rate changes). Trade unions are also concerned with 
interest rate, though maybe not to such a  high extent. Their primary concern is 
unemployement. So their pressure on monetary policy is in order to influence inflation, which 
in turn through the Phillips curve trade-off  stabilizes unemployment. Other groups including 
economists, world and European institutions and opposition parties have also many 
motivations. It is worth reminding that the Slovak Republic was during the studied period
14 
on the path to become a member of EMU. 
Second, Maier introduced a  new variable called public support, which contributes to the 
factual independence of the central bank. If an article featured a  supportive statement 
regardelss of the actual monetary policy it was assigned value of +1. This extended approach 
was further applied by Geršl (2006) on the Czech National Bank. He adjusted the study to 
small open economy of the former Soviet union- the Czech Republic. As the Slovak Republic 
is very similar to the Czech Republic, this study is to be inspired by Geršl (2006). 
As pointed out by Geršl (2006)
15, Havrilesky`s and Maier`s approach to measuring political 
pressure has some drawbacks. First, it assumes newspaper signalling from interest groups is 
the representative channel of signalling. This might not be true if there are other important 
channels through which interest groups can forward their preferences (e.g.: bilateral meetings, 
telephone calls etc.)
16. Second, it assumes two articles represent twice as much value as one 
article which may be false. And third, the number of articles on monetary policy may vary. It 
                                                 
12 Meaning - Signalling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve. 
13 Wooley (1984), p. 71-75 
14 December 2001 - December 2008. 
15 Geršl (2006), p. 4-5. 
16 Here we go under the assumption the political pressure is more difficult to observe through formal channels than through 
informal ones. Therefore, if we detect pressure signalling in the formal channels (newspapers) then the pressure signalling is 
in the informal channels is more likely to be existent.   6
dependes on whether there is enough news from other areas and whether someone is 
deliberately discussing monetary policy.  
Despite these little difficulties this indicator has desirable properties. This approach deals with 
monetary policy (interest rate)
17, it seeks conflicts during the whole term of the office of a 
government. Furthermore, this indicator measures the pressure on the central bank from the 
various interest groups up to the size and direction. Thus the preferences are known and 
observable, so the dual partisanship is overriden. The assumption here is that monetary policy 
changes will get the incumbents re-elected, so the economy is characterized by adaptive 
expectations. Independent central bank is incorporated in the approach, with the focus on 
measuring the pressure on the central bank and how is this pressure transformed in the real 
changes of monetary policy. And finally, the analysis is going to be conducted in its 
contextual background.  
Conclusively, the indicator based on newspaper signalling has its value despite some 
drawbacks. Due to the lack of other valid indicators concerned with study of the central bank, 
this indicator is even more appreciated.  
We construct the pressure indicator for the NBS according to the Maier (2002)’s extended 
approach based on Havrilesky (1993). Naturally, the first step was to choose a suitable 
newspaper from which to count the “pressure” articles. The selected newspaper is required to 
posses these criteria: 
  independence (the newspaper should be politically neutral in order to avoid political 
bias in published articles),  
  availability (the newspaper should cover reasonably long time), and  
  circulation (the newspaper should be widely read, especially by central bank officials, 
so that signals published there in fact reach the intended recipients). 
Slovakia is a tiny country comparing to the U.S. or Germany so the process of choosing the 
suitable newspaper was relatively more difficult. The only newspaper which systematically 
covers economic events in Slovakia, which is widely available and read by economic 
authorities and which is deemed to be politically neutral is Hospodárske noviny
18 (“the 
economic newspaper”). This newspaper is owned by the same company as the Czech 
newspaper Hospodářské noviny, thus sharing similar structure. It is obvious this newspaper 
could be easily deemed as a  counterpart to the U.S. Wall Street Journal (selected by 
Havrilesky) or the German German Handelsblatt (one of the newspapers selected by Maier). 
Nevertheless, as will be seen in the analysis, also this newspaper may suffer from lack of 
appropriate coverage of monetary policy issues, thus any analysis based on signals collected 
from this newspaper may be misleading.
19 
The second step was to choose an appropriate period. Slovakia practised exchange rate peg 
from the mid-1994 until late-1998 (to the basket of DEM with 40% weight and USD with 
60% weight). In this period the NBS sustained a  mix of inflation targeting, monetary 
programming and regime of fixed interest rate. Afterwards the Slovak koruna moved to 
floating with the exchange rate determined by the supply and demand on the interbank 
exchange market. The NBS was concentrating more on the inflation targeting and the 
                                                 
17 Which is easily quantificable but not incorporating other monetary policy tools. 
18 The articles from the electronic archive of Hospodárske noviny were used (http://archiv.hnonline.sk/). 
19 We thank an anonymous referee for making us aware that the Hospodarske noviny in Slovakia do not have the 
same high status as economics newspaper as the Hospodarske noviny in the Czech Republic which were used by 
Gersl (2006).   7
exchange rate stability (favourable for export and matching the economic fundamentals) using 
the Interest Rate, Exchange Rate Interventions and Minimal Reserve Requirements as its 
tools. The floating ended at the end of 2005 when the Slovak koruna entered the ERM II 
(Europe Exchange Rate Mechanism) where it stayed for two years. In this period the policy of 
the NBS was explicit inflation targeting and the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria. The NBS 
was under pressure from the ECB and other European/international institutions. The Slovak 
currency was revaluated two times (2007 and 2008) as the economic fundametals allowed for 
this and which was approved by ECB. Finally, on the first  January 2009 the euro was 
introduced in Slovakia and the dual circulation of the two currencies finished on 16 January 
2009.  
Based on this information, the period of December 2001 – December 2008 was chosen 
accomodating 85 months for the rigorous analysis. Following Geršl (2006) the period with the 
exchange rate peg (1994-1998) was excluded due to limitations in the monetary policy 
instruments available, non-fully functional banking sector and non-reformist government 
(prime minister – controversial Vladimír Mečiar). The period 1998-2001 is excluded partly 
due to the unavailability of the articles in the archive of Hospodárske noviny and partly due to 
the fact the new government just started reforming the functionality of the banking and 
financial sector.  
In line with Maier (2002), we have counted articles either directly published by members of 
five different interest groups or where members of these interest groups were quoted. The 
following five pressure groups were identified:  
  government, which includes all ministers of the current government, but also other 
members of the political parties forming the government (most of them members of 
parliament, but some of them also outside the parliament),  
  financial sector, including representatives and analysts of all domestic banks and other 
financial institutions (insurance corporations, pension and investment funds etc.),  
  employers, i.e. representatives (managers) of non-financial corporations
20,  
  trade unions, and  
  other, including all other articles demanding change in monetary policy by other than 
members of the four above mentioned groups. (i.e. from the general public, journalists, 
political parties in opposition, international institutions, members of academia, 
independent researchers etc.). In the case of the NBS a  lot of pressure articles 
originated from the European/international financial institutions
21 as the Slovak 
Republic was preparing to enter the EMU.  
All the articles that dealt with the National Bank of Slovakia were carefully reviewed and 
assessed. Following Maier (2002), Geršl (2006), and in contrast to Havrilesky (1993), the 
articles demanding monetary ease were assigned the value of -1, while the articles demanding 
monetary tightness were assigned the value of +1. This was done in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the regression results later on. For measuring the “net” pressure, the sum of 
all pluses and minuses for all five interest groups and for the total were constructed at a 
monthly frequency, so that a negative sum indicates interest group’s net pressure for monetary 
ease, while a positive sum the net pressure for monetary restrictiveness.  
                                                 
20 ZPS (Združenie podnikateľov Slovenska), SOPK (Slovenská obchodná a priemyselná komora), klub 500. 
21 ECB, IMF, OECD.   8
Following Geršl (2006), the ratio of the sum to the total number of observations for every 
group and for total pressure was calculated. In comparison to the sum, the ratio has some 
advantageous features. First, because it relates to the net pressure as measured by the sum to 
the total number of pressure signals, it shows the degree of internal integrity of the group. 
Hereby, it is shown whether the pressure from members of a certain interest group is going in 
one direction (both over time and across different members of the same group), or whether it 
is rather heterogeneous. Thus, for a given level of the net pressure as measured by the sum, 
the higher the ratio (in absolute terms), the higher homogenity of the pressure group (both 
over time and over different members of the group) and the more are signals from this group 
going in one direction. Second, in comparison to the sum, it is independent of the time period 
over which the ratio is calculated. As a result, it is possible to compare the pressure as 
measured by the ratio across countries, even if the time coverage is different.  
As well as the Czech economy, the Slovak economy is a small and open one in contrast to the 
U.S. or Germany. Following Geršl (2006) we have to consider the impact exchange rate 
changes have on the small economy. Many export oriented companies may find themselves 
threatened by the strong Slovak koruna, reducing their profits. The managers of these non-
financial companies or their political representatives may then demand an exchange rate 
intervention aimed at weakening the Slovak koruna (the desire for an exchange rate 
intervention aimed at weakening Slovak koruna was assigned value -1 as it is comparable to a 
desire for monetary ease). Sometimes a commercial bank may desire an exchange rate 
intervention aimed at strenghtening the Slovak koruna. The first motive to do so would be if a 
commercial bank felt the real economy did not match the strength of the exchange rate. It is 
known the commercial banks also desire price stability. The second motive would be the high 
interest rate spread between the Western Europe and Slovakia. Thus, if the Slovak koruna 
depreciates the profits of the foreign investors are reduced, which is followed by the outflow 
of capital from the Slovak banks (a demand for an exchange rate intervention aimed at 
strenghtening Slovak koruna was assigned value +1 as it is comparable to a desire for 
monetary tightness)
22.  
It must be noted the pressure index is unable to capture all the pressure exercised on the 
National Bank of Slovakia. There were some political attempts of the one of the opposition 
parties to eliminate the former governor of the NBS. Furthermore there were some 
institutional reforms of the banking sector which altered the powers and functioning of the 
NBS. And finally, a certain unique aspect of the the Slovak economy should be discussed.  
The decision to enter the EU followed by entering the EMU is an economic-political 
consensus. From one perspective, this fact reduces pressure between the government and the 
NBS. Thus it is not always clear what is the independent central bank policy because the 
decision to enter the EMU is not of a purely economic nature. From the other perspective, one 
may not view the articles written by the European institutions consulting the Slovak economic 
affairs as the pressure signals. However, this would be a huge mistake. The official policy of 
the NBS was to enter the EMU and to fulfil the Maastricht criteria while sustaining stability 
of the Slovak economy. The European institutions often force countries to concentrate 
exclusively on the Maastricht criteria overlooking the economic situation of the particular 
country
23. The pressure signals were extracted excluding some of these unclear quasi-pressure 
indications and including the relevant Slovak case-related pressure signals. 
                                                 
22 These pressure articles constitute a small part of the overall pressure (call for interventions mainly by the financial sector or 
by the other sources) - amounting to 8 articles demanding intervention aimed at either strengthening or weakening Slovak 
koruna. 
23 Due to lack of understanding of the local economy, over-empasizing the needs of the EU, bureaucracy.   9
4. Political Pressure on the NBS from the government 
In this chapter we will present the collected data. We will compare the countries where the 
pressure indicator was constructed so far. The key focus remains on the National Bank of 
Slovakia.
24 The pressure shall be then explained by the economic fundamentals, political 
situation and institutional framework of Slovakia during the period 2001-2008. 
We shall start with comparing the pressure from the government which is the only group 
Havrilesky considered. According to the theory of Political Business Cycle and common 
sense the incumbent government has many motivations to influence the central bank and has 
many direct or indirect tools at its disposal to accomplish this. So this may be the reason 
Havrilesky examined this sole group.  
Table 1 shows several interesting aspects about the four countries. 
Table 1: Polical pressure on central banks from government 
  NBS  CNB FED  Bundesbank 
        
# signals   6  41 287  85 











(number of months)  85  94 480  468 
# signals per year  0.8  5.2 7.2  2.2 
        
# signals for monetary ease  6  41 192  78 
# signals for monetary tightness  0  0 95  7 
net pressure (sum)  -6  -41 -97  -71 
        
ratio (sum/# signals)  -100%  -100% -33.8%  -83.5% 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnoline.sk, Geršl (2006), Havrilesky (1993),  
Maier (2002)  
First, there are differences concerning the intensity of the pressure signals. We can clearly see 
there is a huge difference between the signalling from government in the European countries 
and in the USA. The USA is considered to be the world`s leading market economy where the 
institutions and market liberalisation are at the top level. This together with different political 
culture/traditions could freely contribute to the high amount of pressure signals on the Fed 
from government. Politicians in the European countries tend to be rather more respectable of 
central bank and more reserved about its declarations or simply newspaper articles may report 
less on monetary issues. There are 287 pressure signals for the FED comparing to 85 pressure 
signals for the Bundesbank (despite the fact Maier in his study has reviewed 3 newspaper 
magazines). The Bundesbank is thought to be the most independent central bank in the world 
and the data imply it enjoys high respect from the government.  
                                                 
24 The comparison between the Fed, the Bundesbank, the CNB and justification of government`s pressure was provided in 
Havrilesky (1993), Maier (2002) and Geršl (2005), respectively. This paper will concentrate on how the Slovak case fits into 
this formula.   10
From another point of view one can differentiate between the industrialized countries 
(Germany) and the transition/developing countries (Slovakia and the Czech Republic). As 
Farrag and Kamaly (2007)
25 suggests, legal charter does not reflect the degree of 
independence of central bank in developing countries. The legal charter is often ambigous 
leaving a lot of room for subjective interpretation and the actual practice often deviates from 
the law. This implies there is some room for central bank dependency on government because 
the law is not specific enough and what is more, the real behaviour is often driven by less 
formal rules (in the case of transition countries – the remnants of left-wing centralistic 
behaviour). Therefore there could be no need for such a strong signalling from government in 
newspapers if the poor institutional framework and bad practice gives politicians room for 
pressure signalling.  
As we can see the number of pressure signals for the CNB is 41, which is considerably higher 
than the modest 6 signals in the case of the NBS. The case of Slovakia may here support the 
notion proposed by Farrag and Kamaly, but the Czech Republic is somewhere halfway 
between Germany and Slovakia. The Czech Republic is thought to be a step ahead of 
Slovakia in the institutional-market-economic transition.
26 
There are several other explanations why there si so small number of pressure signals from 
the Slovak government on the NBS. In his paper Mas (1994)
27 argues “in countries with 
shallow financial systems, monetary policy is the reverse side of the coin of fiscal policy and 
can only play an accomodative role.” So we can easily deduce incumbent government does 
not need to push so hard for changes in monetary policy (interest rate tightness/easiness) 
when it does have this powerful tool at its disposal. Beblavy (2003)
28 in his study observes 
interesting results. He presented a questionnaire to the central banks officials in the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia concerning political and economic independence of 
central bank. He finds out officials of the NBS are much less concerned about some aspects of 
political independence from the government than officials of the CNB.
29 Their lack of 
concerns suggests the connections to the incumbent government may be very real, the 
perception of central bank independence very vague. If the politicians can influence monetary 
policy in this manner they have no need to exert pressure through newspaper articles.  
The government in Slovakia respects opinions and independence of the NBS (at least in the 
newspaper). This idea could be reinforced by the fact the government in the given period was 
pro-reformist and right-winged. There was a strong economic fundament in its personnel and 
thus its actions.
30 An intuitive explanation could be delivered following Schultz (1995). The 
incentives for government to manipulate economic policy may have been weak. This could be 
very well due to the fact the risk of ruining reputation were quite high. What is more there are 
few voters who have rational expectations and few voters with adaptive expectations. The 
majority of the voters in Slovakia are more persuaded by media presentation of politicians 
than the economic policies.  
                                                 
25 Farrag and Kamaly (2007), p. 4. 
26 Although current development suggests Slovakia has made huge progress (i.e. joining the EMU). 
27 Mas (1994), p. 35. 
28 Beblavy (2003), p. 63. 
29 On scale 1 to 10 (1 being least important, 10 being most important); to Criterion 1: CB governor not appointed directly by 
governmet (CNB – 10, NBS – 3), to Criterion 2: CB governor appointed for more than 5 years (CNB – 10, NBS – 5), to 
Criterion 3: Rest of the board not appointed directly by government (CNB – 10, NBS – 3), to Criterion 4: No govt. 
representative on the board (CNB – 8, NBS – 0), to Criterion 6: Requirement in the CB law that CB pursue monetary stability 
(CNB – 10, NBS – 6). 
30 Consider former Vice-Prime Minister for Economics and former Minister of Finance Ivan Mikloš.   11
The pressure from the the politicians on the central bank could have ambiguos impacts. Given 
the respect of the central bank, distrust in politicians by the people and bad image of 
politicians presented by media the potential pressure on the NBS could have had a disastrous 
impact on government`s preferences in the following elections. Thus the theoretic conclusion 
is that political pressure on the government may not always result in higher preferences.  
Second, the pressure from the the governments on the central banks in all four countries was 
on average towards monetary ease. Both Slovak and Czech governments were asking 
exclusively for monetary ease. The pressure of the German Government was prevailingly for 
monetary ease while the U.S. Government asked more for monetary contraction comparing to 
the rest of the countries. The reason for this nature of pressure could be explained by the 
economic development in these countries. Slovakia and the Czech Republic (former 
Czechoslovakia) shared common traits concerning economic funadaments. The GDP growth 
was weak, inflation was rather declining and the interest rate relatively high. As transition 
economies these two countries had a room to expand their overall growth. So the pressure for 
monetary ease seemed to be natural. Similarly, the inflation in Germany was on average 
rather low, so the German Government wanted to exploit effects of the Phillips curve to 
pursue growth in the economy. Different situation arose in the USA, where the inflation of the 
1970s and 1980s was quite a threat, so the fight against the inflation was the primary goal of 
incumbent government.  
Third, the government of the U.S. was the least homogenous from all the studied countries. 
Whereas, the Slovak and the Czech governments were perfectly homogenous pertaining the 
pressure signalling. The question is whether in the U.S. case there was a heterogenity across 
the different members of the government or a heterogenity across the time. Chart 1 could shed 
light into this problem.  
Chart 1: The “net” political pressure on the Fed from the government 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: authors` calculations based on Havrilesky (1993) 
As we can see from the Chart 1 the pressure is concentrated in clusters and peaks. Small 
homogenity needs not to be the only explanation for the high peaks in the U.S. It is possible 
there is a higher flexibility of the American free market which has been established for 
a  considerable longer time than in Slovakia. This flexibility includes the usage and   12
functioning of media, concretly speaking the newspapers. Another possibility for such 
a fluctuos behaviour of the pressure from the government on the Fed is the sensitive reactivity 
of the U.S. Government to the actual economic developments
31 and decision-making of the 
Fed. The U.S. Government then reacted proportionally to its political goals. Such a flexibility 
is something that is very scarce in Slovakia. For comparison let us present the pressure 
exerted from the German Government on the Bundesbank in time.  
Chart 2: The “net” political pressure on Bundesbank from government 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: Maier (2002), www.phillipp-maier.de 
Chart 2 confirms graphically the pressure is mainly towards monetary ease and the peaks are 
less extreme compared to the signalling towards the Fed on Chart 2. There are also more gaps 
between individual peaks of pressure indicating the underlying economic development in 
Germany was less fluctuos and more stable or it could just mean, as asserted before, higher 
respect for the decision making of the Bundesbank than in the case of the Fed.  
 
                                                 
31 As mentioned before the period of high inflation in the USA in the 1970s and 1980s.    13
Chart 3: The “net” political pressure on CNB from government 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: Geršl (2006) 
Following on Chart 3, there is the graphical interpretation of the pressure signalling from the 
government on the Czech National Bank. As Table 1 proposes and Chart 3 clearly shows 
there is a relatively high concentration of signalling in such a small country like the Czech 
Republic. We could see there has been a lot of conflict between the CNB and the Czech 
Government. And finally the Chart 4 illustrates the pressure signalling in the case of the NBS. 
Chart 4: The “net” political pressure on the NBS from government 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk 
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The graphics confirm there was very little pressure exerted on the National Bank of Slovakia. 
The pressure peaks are also the smallest from all the countries and we can deduce there was 
little conflict between the Slovak Government and the NBS. We could speculate the Slovak 
Government does not signal much and respects the policy-making of the NBS, and uses this 
way of pressure signalling as the option of the last resort. Therefore either the pressure peaks 
might have occurred when the economic situation of the country was very serious from the 
point of view of the Slovak Government or the Slovak Government exerted pressure prior to 
the end of electoral cycle in line with the PBC hypothesis. This notion will be further formally 
examined in the following chapters. 
Fourth, the pressure singnalling from the government on central banks in Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic and Germany constitutes a relatively small amount of the total pressure executed on 
respective central banks. This clearly heightens the attractivness of Maier`s extension to the 
original Havrilesky methodology. Note also, the pressure signalling from the government on 
the NBS constitutes the tinest part comparing to that of the CNB or the Bundesbank. As will 
be seen in the following chapter, the main signalling pressure group in Slovakia was financial 
sector.  
5. Total political pressure on the NBS and its decomposition 
Table 2 gives us a closer look at the comparison of the decomposed index between three 
countries it is possible to do so (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Germany). All sectors which have 
exerted pressure on the central banks will be analysed with a graphical interpretation in time. 
There are several interesting aspects to be seen about the pressure pattern differences between 
the NBS, the CNB and the Bundesbank.  
First, the frequency of the pressure signals in total was lowest in Slovakia (only 11.6 
compared to 23 in the Czech Republic and 13.5 in Germany). However, the frequency of total 
pressure signalling towards the NBS is comparable to that of the Bundesbank.  This fact is 
clearly visible in the Chart 5. This could be very well due to the relative respect of the 
National Bank of Slovakia (the Government led by reformist Prime Minister Mikuláš 
Dzurinda from 1998-2006) and a very short time of existence of the NBS`s independent 
monetary policy.
32 
Second, in line with the pressure towards the Bundesbank and the CNB the pressure towards 
the NBS was also rather towards monetary ease, overally. However, in Slovakia the pressure 
for monetary restriction and ease were the most even (only 19.5% net pressure signals of total 
pressure signals were towards monetary ease in Slovakia, whereas 64.3% in Germany and 
92.2% in the Czech Republic). So the biggest contrast could be seen between very similar 
countries (which constituted the former Czechoslovakia). The prevalent pressure for monetary 
ease was caused by relative short time span and low inflation in the Czech Republic. In the 
Slovak case, the government had problems in controlling its fiscal deficit so we could see 
positive values on the Chart 5 during 2005 -2007 indicating demand for monetary tightness. 
The rest of the total pressure is mainly for monetary ease caused by low inflation and good 
preparation of the Slovakia to enter the EMU. 
Third, the financial sector is the pillar signaller in Slovakia (the signals from the financal 
sector constitute 75.6% of total signalling). The frequency of signalling was the highest in 
Slovakia and even the absolute amount of the signals from the financial sector was higher in 
Slovakia than in the Czech Republic (although the number of the total pressure signals in 
Slovakia is the lowest one). This high proportion of signaling from the financial sector may be 
                                                 
32 The National Bank of Slovakia came to existence in 1993 descending from the former Czecho-Slovak National Bank 
which was heavily influenced by the former communist regime.   15
caused by the fact the corporate financial personnel are besides the central bank personnel an 
exclusive group (besides the central bank presonnel) with knowledge of the monetary issues. 
This idea seems to be very natural when considering a recently transformed country like 
Slovakia. There are few sectors of population which fully assimilated the newly formed 
market mechanisms in such a short period of time (year 1989 – breakdown of the Soviet 
Union). 
Table 2: Political pressure on central banks                                                
  NBS  CNB Bundesbank 
period covered  2001:12-2008:12  1997:6-2005:3 1960:1-1998:12 







# signals  82  180 527 
(out of all pressure signals)  100%  100% 100% 
# signals per year  11.6  23 13.5 
net pressure (sum, minus=ease)  -16  -166 -339 












# signals  6  41 85 
(out of all pressure signals)  7.3%  22.8% 16.1% 
# signals per year  0.8  5.2 2.2 
net pressure (sum, minus=ease)  -6  -41 -71 

















  # signals  62  40 140 
(out of all pressure signals)  75.6%  22.2% 26.6% 
# signals per year  8.8  5.1 3.6 
net pressure (sum, minus=ease)  -8  -28 -78 











# signals  1  36 55 
(out of all pressure signals)  1.2%  20% 10.4% 
# signals per year  0.1  4.6 1.4 
net pressure (sum, minus=ease)  -1  -36 -29 














# signals  0  6 69 
(out of all pressure signals)  0%  3.3% 13.1% 
# signals per year  0  0.8 1.8 
net pressure (sum, minus=ease)  0  -6 -60 














  # signals  13  57 178 
(out of all pressure signals)  15.9%  31.7% 33.8% 
# signals per year  1.8  7.3 4.6 
net pressure (sum, minus=ease)  -1  -55 -92 
ratio (sum/# signals)  7.7%  -96.5% -51.7% 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk, Geršl (2006), Maier (2002)    16
Chart 5: The total “net” political pressure on the NBS, the CNB and the Bundesbank 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk, Geršl (2006), Maier (2002) 
Fourth, the pressure from financial sector in all three countries was rather for monetary ease. 
Chart 6 provides us with a graphical interpretation. What should be noted is that although the 
frequency of the signals from the financial sector in Slovakia was the highest, the net pressure 
for the monetary ease is here the lowest in Slovakia (only – 8, whereas – 28 in the Czech 
Republic and – 78 in Germany). The majority of the signals have cancelled out.  
Chart 6: The total “net” political pressure on the NBS, the CNB and the Bundesbank 
from financial sector 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk, Geršl (2006), Maier (2002) 
Let us have a closer look at the background of signalling of the financial sector in Slovakia as 
the most important and influential signalling pressure group. According to the theoretical 
literature, the financial sector functions as the counterpart to the pressure attempts of an 
incumbent government. When comparing Chart 4 and Chart 6 we see this is true only in 2007 
(the pressure signals went in opposing directions) otherwise this notion is violated. The 
uderlying economic development of Slovakia will serve us as explanation for this 
phenomenon. It is important to note the economic fundaments of the country are of a very   17
high concern to the financial sector. The financial sector as well as the NBS seek financial 
stability because any extreme measures (high increases of interest rates, poor growth and 
perfomance of the economy, etc.) endanger the credibility of its debtors, endanger functioning 
of market mechanisms, interbank market and thus also their own image in the eyes of their 
creditors. It is in the interest of the financial sector to optimize economic situation of the 
country (stability means safety, changes and extremes mean riskiness). 
Firstly, let us consider the period 2001-2005. Financial sector was well aware of the 
development of GDP growth and its pressure was intended to adjust the economic situation 
exploiting the best economic growth. Chart 7 represents the development of GDP growth. 
From 2001-2005 the pressure from financial sector on the NBS is for monetary ease with the 
exception of the beginning of year 2002 (it will be described in the next point). Throughout 
this period the GDP growh had rising tendencies which enabled for the healthy growth of the 
economy. Financial sector observed the situation in a similar manner and pushed for monetary 
ease so that new investments could have been made.  
Chart 7: Developmnet of the GDP growth 




Secondly, the beginning of 2002 is exceptional in some respects. From the Chart 6 we could 
observe there was a pressure on the NBS from financial sector towards monetary contraction. 
There was a substantial increase in the world price of oil which was reflected in the huge 
jump in the rate of inflation at the end of 2002. Chart 8 plastically illustrates this situation. So 
in order to stabilize economic development financial sector has pushed for lowering of the 
interest rate.  
Thirdly, it is noteworthy to have a closer look at the period from 2005 to 2007. There is an 
improvement of GDP growth in Slovakia followed by a little decline (consult Chart 7). The 
sudden increase was a result of fine performance of the Slovak economy which was caused by 
the increase of foreign investments and foreign consumption in the country. The better 
perfomance and productivity were also fueled by economic reforms. The little setback that 
followed was accompanied by the rise of inflation which could be seen on the Chart 8. So the 
financial sector exerted pressure towards monetary contraction (Chart 6) in an attempt to 
signal to the National Bank of Slovakia to stabilize the situation.  
                                                 
33 Counted cummulatively, the change of growth in a period with respect to the corresponding period year before.   18
Chart 8: Development of the inflation 
(in %, CPI y-o-y monthly data) 
 
Source: NBS 
Final period to consider is 2007-2008. There was an outstanding performance of the Slovak 
economy in 2007 (Chart 7) where the foreign and domestic consumption fueled the GDP 
growth. After, there was a decline in the GDP growth caused by the starting consequences of 
the world credit crisis. The inflation was slightly rising but still remaining at reasonable levels 
(Chart 8). Keeping this in mind the financial sector in Slovakia demanded strongly for 
monetary ease in 2007 when the GDP growth was the highest in order to exploit the situation 
to its fullest. After that financial sector pushed for monetary ease as in an attempt to signal the 
NBS that by loosening the monetary conditions the economy could recover from the ongoing 
world financial crisis. Though the signalling for monetary ease was a little bit more sensitive 
than before.  
There is an interesting relationship between the official interest rate of the NBS and the 
pressure from the financial sector during the period 2001 – 2008. As already asserted the 
financial sector consists of the experts with the greatest knowledge of the economic 
background of the country. The financial sector represents a sort of controlling organism for 
the economic stability which is the primary concern of a central bank. As already known it is 
in their best interest. When looking at the Chart 9 several interesting facts could be observed. 
The development of the interest of the NBS rate roughly reacts to the pressure signalling of 
the financial sector. The National Bank of Slovakia had the same view of the economic 
development or actually reacted to the financial sector signalling with a certain lag. From the 
Chart 9, a demand for monetary restriction triggered a rise in the interest rate and vice versa. 
The financial sector pressure chart appears to be an indicator of the slope (direction of the 
slope and roughly the magnitude) of the development of the interest rate of the NBS with 
some time lag. 
Fifth, the situation concerning the pressure exercised by employers is very different in 
Slovakia from Germany and the Czech Republic. There was just one signal demanding 
monetary ease in Slovakia (as opposed to 36 in the Czech Republic and 55 in Germany). The 
direction of the pressure is as mentioned towards monetary ease which is in line with the 
„net“ pressure in Germany and the Czech Republic. Chart 10 illustrates the comparison of the 
pressure for the three countries.  
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Chart 9: Development of the 2W repo rate of the NBS and the total “net” political 
pressure on the NBS from financial sector 
(2W repo rate is the official interest rate of the NBS - in %
34, net political pressure on the 
NBS from financial pressure - # of signals ) 
 
Source: authors‘ calculations, NBS 
There are several reasons for such a small number of pressure signals in Slovakia. One of the 
primary goals of the NBS is the exchange rate stability and the NBS was especially sensitive 
to this issue.
35 This was true even when the European and international institutions 
recommended inverse movements of the key interest rates. The NBS was fully aware the 
exchange rate was important as the Slovak economy (small open economy) was heavily 
dependent on export. Although the overall growth (Chart 7) of the economy was enabling for 
a stronger currency and more rapid decline in the exchange rate the the NBS managed to keep 
the Slovak koruna weak proportionally to the healthy progress of the economy, enabling for 
a more sensitive decline (Chart 11).
36 This optimization of the exchange rate and maintenance 
of favorable position for the exporters (majority of the employers) was reached through 
careful interventions on the foreign exchange and keeping of the key interest rate at relatively 
low levels with a  declining tendency (Chart 9). Consequently, having such a  care the 
employers had little need for exerting any serious pressure signalling on the National Bank of 
Slovakia.  
The employers seem to look up to the decision making of the central bank and majority of 
their signalling was supporting the actual central bank`s policy (as will be seen in the next 
chapter).  
                                                 
34 Monthly averages. 
35 During the chairmanship of the both governors: Marián Jusko (1999 - 2004) and Ivan Šramko (2005 - ). 
36 From 2006 – 2008 the exchange rate decline was more rapid which to fulfiling of the Maastricht criteria, strong economy 
growth and consensus of the NBS and the government to reach as strongest currency as possible before the introduction of 
euro (the central exchange rate parity was lowered for the second time in 30.5.2008 to a lower level of 30,126 which became 
the conversion rate).   20
Chart 10: The total “net” political pressure on the NBS, the CNB and the Bundesbank 
from employers 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk, Geršl (2006, ), Maier (2002)  
Chart 11: Development of SKK/EUR exchange rate 
(average monthly data, 1998 - 2005: floating exchange rate, 2005 - 2008: ERM II) 
 
Source: NBS 
Sixth, the pressure from the trade unions was even more rare than that of employers. There 
was no pressure signal detected from the trade unions in Slovakia. Let us look at Chart 12 for 
a graphic interpretation. In Germany and the Czech Republic the signaling was quite modest 
and towards monetary ease. The fact there was no political pressure exercised by the trade 
unions in Slovakia is even more intriguing considering that nearly throughout the whole 
studied period the reformist right-winged goverment was holding power (1998-2006). One 
possible explanation could be offered by the development of unemployement in Slovakia. 
Consider Chart 13. 
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Chart 12: The total “net” political pressure on the NBS, the CNB and the Bundesbank 
from trade unions 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk, Geršl (2006), Maier (2002)  
The declining unemployment with some minor fluctuations throughout the whole studied 
period was a result of increasing foreign investments in Slovakia. The trade unions could have 
been satisfied with this situation without a need to put pressure on the NBS. Alternatively, it 
is possible the trade unions concentrated on different issues concerning public spending, 
goverment`s employment policy, the new labour code. The trade unions were not involved in 
a conflict with the NBS as more urgent matters required their attention. The articles reviewed 
showed the trade unions conflicts were mainly with the government (e.g. often criticizing the 
public spending of the government).  
Chart 13: Development of the unemployment 
(in %, unemployment y-o-y monthly data) 
 
Source: NBS 
And seven, the pressure exercised by other groups (journalists, members of academia, 
politicians from the opposition, international institutions representatives, and the general 
public) is shown in the Chart 14. The pressure was very sporadic in Slovakia (just 9 pressure   22
signals comparing to 57 signals in the Czech Republic and 178 signals in Germany). This 
sector was very active in the Czech Republic (7.3 signals per year, opposing to 1.3 signals per 
year in Slovakia) – another huge difference between the states of the former Czechoslovakia. 
It could be seen this pressure group was very heterogenous in Slovakia (the signals nearly 
cancelled out – ratio 11.1%). It seems to be a natural fact as this group consists of very 
different individuals and sub-groups. The most active sub-group exercising the pressure on 
the NBS were IMF (International Monetary Fund) and other European/international 
institutions (ECB, OECD). This is natural because Slovakia was during the studied period on 
the verge to enter the EMU. The other sources group was very homogenous in the Czech 
Republic which hints on harmonic consistency and perception of the policy of the CNB by 
these rather independent groups. For Germany the group was 51.7% consistent.  
Chart 14: The total “net” political pressure on the NBS, the CNB and the Bundesbank 
from other sources 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk, Geršl (2006), Maier (2002)  
6 The construction and the role of the support variable 
In this section we are going to closely examine the support for the monetary policy. Following 
Maier (2002) and Geršl (2006) the articles expressing support for the actual monetary policy 
were reviewed and assigned value of +1. The support examined is considered regardless the 
actual monetary policy stance of the central bank. As the theoretical literature suggests the 
role of the support is important when considering political pressure on the central bank. It 
could eliminate pressure from the other interest groups and enable central bank to concentrate 
on the important decisions about the economic fundaments. Table 3 presents data for National 
Bank of Slovakia, Czech National Bank and the Bundesbank. We could observe several 
interesting differences  among these three central banks. 
As well as the number of the total pressure signals to the NBS the number of total support 
signals to the NBS is the smallest from the three countries. There were detected 27 articles 
supporting the NBS (compared to 90 in the Czech Republic and 311 in Germany). Naturally, 
the frequency of signaling per year is the smallest one for the NBS, too. The NBS received 
very few signals from the government (which is in line with the low number of pressure 
signals) and from the trade unions (literally no signals). The Czech Republic also received no 
support from the trade unions. This situation in both countries could be explained by the   23
arguments in the previous section.
37 The financial sector in Slovakia supported the NBS very 
little, comparing to relative huge support in the Czech Republic or Germany (only 0.6 signals 
per year for Slovakia, whereas 4.6 in the Czech Republic and 2.8 in Germany). This is in line 
with the theoretical literature because the financial sector is the most active exercising 
pressure in Slovakia. The most active supporters in Slovakia were employers and other 
sources groups. The employers put forward 1.1 signals per year in Slovakia which is 
comparable to 1.5 signals per year in Germany (only 0.5 signals per year in the Czech 
Republic). It shows the employers in Slovakia and Germany respect the policy of central 
banks and support them regularly. In addition this high frequency of supporting from 
employers in Slovakia is compensated by very low number of pressure signals which is 
consistent with the theoretical literature.  
Table 3: Political support for central banks 
  NBS  CNB Bundesbank 
period covered  2001:12-2008-12  1997:6-2005:3 1960:1-1998:12 







# support signals  27  90 311 
(out of all support signals)  100%  100% 100% 
# support signals per year  3.8  11.5 8 











  # support signals  2  8 90 
(out of all support signals)  7.4%  8.9% 28.9% 
# support signals per year  0.3  1 2.3 

















  # support signals  4  36 111 
(out of all support signals)  14.8%  40% 35.7% 
# support signals per year  0.6  4.6 2.8 











# support signals  8  4 59 
(out of all support signals)  29.6%  4.4% 19% 
# support signals per year  1.1  0.5 1.5 













  # support signals  0  0 6 
(out of all support signals)  0%  0% 1.9% 
# support signals per year  0  0 0.2 














  # support signals  13  42 45 
(out of all support signals)  48.1%  46.7% 14.5% 
# support signals per year  1.8  5.4 1.2 
ratio (# support/# pressure)  100%  73.7% 25.3% 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk, Geršl (2006), Maier (2002)  
                                                 
37 Transforming economies, relative infancy of the central banks, relative respect, etc.   24
The most interesting variable it is worth to look at is the ratio of support signals to pressure 
signals. This variable shows the homogenity within the group. As described by Geršl (2006) 
a very low ratio would indicate the group is putting pressure mainly on monetary policy, 
100% ratio would indicate there is an intensive debate within the group because the there is 
the same amount of signals supporting monetary policy and putting pressure on it, and finally, 
a  very high ratio over 100% would indicate the group is supporting the actual monetary 
policy.  
Totally, this ratio is 50-60% for the Czech Republic and Germany. It means there was some 
debate within all political groups but they were putting pressure more than supporting the 
central bank. In Slovakia there was even more pressure exercised from this point of view, as 
the ratio amounted to 36.5%. The government was homogenous in the case of the CNB 
(19.5%), slightly less homogenous in the case of the NBS (33.3%) which is still in accordance 
with the theoretical literature. Empirics from these two former Communist countries does 
support the notion of „everlasting“ conflict of interest between the government and the central 
bank. A divergence from this rule could be seen in the case of the Bundesbank where the 
support-pressure ratio amounted 105.9%. The German Government was rather supporting the 
Bundesbank which could be explained by a very high respect of the German Government for 
the Bundesbank. Still there was a lot of debate.  
Financial sector for the case of the NBS is fairly consistent (ratio of 6.9%) compared to the 
high ratios in the case of the Bundesbank or the CNB.  
For the employers sector the three countries differ substantially and the ratio for each country 
represents one of the possible scenarios. Huge 800% in the case of the NBS tells us the 
support for the National Bank of Slovakia was immense. As previously mentioned the Slovak 
economy is heavily dependent on export and this is very well known to the NBS. Thus the 
politics of the NBS is very well synchronized with the public declarations of the employers 
sector. In the case of the CNB the ratio was 11.1% which indicates prevailing pressure over 
support. And for the Bundesbank the pressure relative to support ratio amounted to 107.3% 
which is the case of intense debate within the employers group. 
For the trade unions there are virtually no signals so the ratios play no role. And finally, the 
ratio for the unspecified groups amounted to 144.4% in the case of the NBS which means 
there is more of a pressure on the central bank than support. From the three countries the ratio 
for the NBS was the highest.  
It is important to note that the support-to-pressure ratio could be a little bit misleading because 
the government does not necessarily have to be in a conflict with the central bank at all times. 
There are times during the political business cycle when government pursues the same goals 
as the central bank. It is possible to explain why the government does not have to be in 
a conflict with the central bank at all times. In the middle of the political business cycle when 
the government is less worried about the elections pursuing the independent economically 
„healthy“ goals of the central bank should be a  good alternative. What is more this 
participation on good economic politicy is easily advertised by the government to the broad 
public. This was shown in the case of Slovakia under the Mikuláš Dzurinda`s pro-reformist 
government and under current Fico`s government. The majority of economic decisions were 
in line with the NBS. To conclude this idea the support signals do not have to be in opposition 
to the pressure signals. The ratio of 100% does not have to mean there is an intense debate 
within the group. If the different members of the group signalled both pressure and support in 
one unit of time and the ratio would be calculated for each separate unit of time and 
aggregated then it would be perfectly correct. But the ratio is time dependent and actions done   25
months or years apart have different contexts.
38 The government could well be sometimes 
agreeable of the central bank`s policy and sometimes not.  
Chart 15 gives us a further illustration of the total political support for the three countries. 
Slovakia tends to differ for all studied political sectors from the other countries. As table 3 
suggests the case of the NBS si different in every political sector from the other countries and 
the total number of support signals is more more modest.
39 However, there could be found 
some patterns of similarity. It would be difficult to compare the support for the NBS with the 
support for the Bundesbank but quite reasonable to compare it with the support for the CNB. 
The peaks of suport tends to be higher in both countries earlier on with decreasing tendency 
later on. The support for the NBS is thus considered to be significant comparable to the 
support for the CNB.  
Chart 15: The total political support for the Bundesbank, the CNB and the NBS 
(number of support signals) 
 
Source: authors` calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk, Geršl (2006), Maier (2002)  
 
7. Explaining the pressure 
Maier (2002) and Geršl (2006) use the pressure data in estimating econometrically whether 
political pressure had an impact on setting the monetary policy rates by the respective central 
bank. As indicated earlier, the relatively low number of signals and the fact that most signals 
come from financial sector representatives (mainly analysts) prevent us from doing a 
comprehensive econometric exercise. 
In this section, we thus only devote a couple of paragraphs to explain the overall pattern in the 
pressure.  
First, an interesting finding as to the emergence of pressure is related to a strange pattern in 
the pressure in relation to the dates of parliamentary elections. In Geršl (2002), one can see 
visiblie spikes in pressure towards monetary easy in pre-election months, while for the NBS 
case this is not visible (Chart 16). 
                                                 
38 There is some time lag caused by the later publishing of the article to the former real declarations. 
39 Due to the higher number of reviewed newspapers for the case of the Bundesbank and more active political groups in the 
case of the CNB.   26
Chart 16: The total “net” political pressure on the NBS 
(“sum” of pressure signals; minus refers to demand for monetary ease) 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on archiv.hnonline.sk 
Second, there was a considerable amount of pressure towards monetary ease exerted in the 
period from the end of 2003 untill beginning of 2004. In 2003, many new reforms have been 
passed (including new income tax law, companies register law, etc.). The unemployment 
(Chart 13) has reached a new record level (15.6%) in 2003 but by the end of the year there 
was further considerable increase. Due to the institutional changes the economy had more 
room to grow freely with the GDP growth still considerably low (Chart 7). Aware of these 
facts and considering the threat of high unemployment
40, the government together with the 
financial sector have signalled substantially towards a decrease in the key central bank interest 
rate. 
Third, at the end of 2005 the total political pressure on the NBS was exerted just by the 
financial sector. As explained before the unemployment was reasonably low while a rise in 
inflation occurred so financial sector signalled for monetary contraction in an attempt for 
stabilization of the economy. The interest rate was shortly increased by the NBS. 
Fourth, the last and biggest pressure peak (beginning of 2007) was also produced by the 
financial sector with some minor help of the other sources. The situation was briefly described 
in the previous chapter. Let us look at it more specifically.  
„Real GDP grew by 10.4 per cent in 2007, helped by buoyant performances in the 
automotive and electronics sectors. The country almost doubled its car production in 
2007 and is now the world’s largest car manufacturer in per capita terms. The fiscal 
deficit amounted to 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2007 (down from a peak of 12.2 per cent in 
2000), thanks to a significant reduction in expenditure and despite the introduction of 
the second-pillar pensions (mandatory private pension schemes) that added just over 1 
                                                 
40 Which is not profitable for the economy and which would trigger criticism from the European institutions monitoring 
readiness of Slovakia to join the EU and consequently the EMU.   27
per cent of GDP a year to outlays. Government debt decreased to 29 per cent of GDP 
in 2007.“
41 
As asserted before this fine ecomic performance motivated the financial sector for more 
monetary contraction to maximal boost of the economy. The reaction of the NBS was a slight 
decrease while holding the interest rate constant for a considerable period of time. The NBS 
perceived the interest rate to be sufficiently low and it was seriously preparing for the 
adoption of the Euro while sustaining the Maastricht criteria. 
 
8. Conclusions 
It is generally accepted that independence of central banks is a vital aspect of a healthy 
economy. However, central banks usually face political pressure from number of pressure 
groups including governemnt, financial sector, employers, trade unions, general public and 
last but not least from various international institutions. In this paper we have researched 
existing literature on political business cycles to find out an appropriate approach to measure 
and explain the the political pressure on the National Bank of Slovakia, the central Bank of 
the Slovak Republic. We have employed the methodology firstly presented by Havrilesky 
(1993) for measuring the political pressure on the U.S. Federal Reserve and further extended 
by Maier (2002), who applied it on the Deutsche Bundesbank. In addition, this methodology 
was modified by Geršl (2006), who studied political pressure on the Czech National Bank. 
He extended the approach for the application on small open economies. The direction, 
intensity and time patterns of the pressure were examined, compared with the patterns of the 
pressure on the Fed, the Bundesbank and the CNB, and explained. Furthermore, the patterns 
and the role of public support for the monetary policy were discussed,.  
The National Bank of Slovakia faced pressure towards monetary ease in the periods 2002-
2004 and 2006-2008, and pressure towards monetary tightness in the period 2004-2006. The 
pressure on the NBS was considerably lower comparing to the pressure on the Fed, The 
Bundesbank, slightly lower than the pressure on the CNB, and with monetary ease-tightness 
peaks comparable to the pressure on the Fed.  
It must be taken into account that given the relatively low number of media signals, the 
results of the analysis might be less robust than for the other countries with which have have 
compared the pressure, i.e. the US, Germany and the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, financial 
sector was the main commenter on monetary policy and was reponsible for more than 75% 
of all signals found. However, this sector – while being an important stakeholder – is not the 
main political body to examine the issue of political independence of central baks. Given this 
fact, we were not able to run a robust econometric estimate of the link between pressure and 
moentary policy rates.   
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